To set up the system, each user chooses two large primes p and q both congruent to 11 modulo 12. Then, he publishes the value of n =pq.
Suppose Alice wants to send a message m to Bob. Then she chooses h E ZYnZ -(0, *l) and sets P = (m*, h 3 ) . Next, she computes c = h3 mod n and b = (Az -l)& mod n, and sends the ciphertext consisting of e, b, xQ = x([2]P), t = @([2]P)/n) and U = mJ42IP)).
To recover the plaintext m, Bob computes the unique ye satisfying ye" -x; + bx; (mod n) with Jacobi symbol t and lsb n. He sets Q = (xa, ye). Letting Q, = Q modp and Q, = Q mod q, he computes P,, = ( x , ,~, yJ (i = 1, 2) such that [2] P,,, = on Q, on C, (b) and similarly Pz,4. Next, he computes I, { i : c2 = yrp"xz,I;' (mod p ) } . He does the same for the prime q. Finally, he computes m, = y2p x; ", c-I modp(i E I,) and m,. So, Bob obtains m using the Chinese remainder theorem such that m 5 (mod p ) and m = mq (mod 4).
Reduction to Rabin-Williams: Since P = (mz, hm3) E C,(b) , it follows that:
and X2m2 m2 + b (mod n ) (2) From eqns. 1 and 2, we construct the polynomials P,,
Since m2 is a root of P, and P2, m2 w i l l be a root of R = gcd(P,, PJ. The polynomial R has a very high probability of degree 1 [6] .
Solving this polynomial in X gives the value of m2.
Conclusion:
We have shown that we can easily recover the value of m2 from the ciphertext corresponding to a plaintext m. Therefore, the Chua-Ling scheme is reduced to the Rabm-Williams cryptosystem.
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A new 2m-bit iterated hash fimction based on an m-bit block cipher with a 2m-bit key is presented. The results of security analysis show that the hash function can be expected to have ideal computational security against the five attacks when the underlying cipher is assumed to have no weakness.
Intuoduction: In cryptographic applications, hash functions are used within digital signature schemes and within schemes to provide data integrity. Owing to the 'birthday attack', about 232 computations of the hash code are needed to find a collision for any hash functions of code length 64bits. Thus, several efforts [l -41 have been made to construct 128 bit hash functions based on a block cipher of block length 64 bits.
In this Letter, we present a new 2m-bit iterated hash function
The results of security analysis show that the hash function can be expected to have ideal computational security against five attacks when the underlying cipher is assumed to have no weakness. Overview of new hash function: The new hash function is an iterated hash function. The computational graph of its round function h is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
The hash round function h can be formulated as follows: to show explicitly the dependence on (Go, HJ and M, where (Go, H,) is a 2m-bit specified initial value. For message data whose total length in bits is not a multiple of m, we can apply deterministic 'padding' [3] to the message to be hashed by eqn. 4 to increase the total length to a multiple of m.
The new hash function takes advantage of MD-strengthening [3, 51, i.e . specify that the last block Mn-, of the message (MO, MI, ..., to be hashed represents the length of the 'true message' in bits, i.e. the length of unpadded portion of the first n -1 blocks. Therefore, the hashed message must contain at least two blocks. ', +, takes, 'target' h(G, _, ,  MzJ is never hit. So we can say that the hash round function can completely resist target attack.
In view of the above fact, target attack on the new hash function must attack more than two rounds of it successively. Considering that the dependent relations of hash outputs to hash inputs in more than two rounds are much more complex than those of one round, only a brute-force target attack, in which one randomly chooses a M' until one hits the 'target' Hash (G,, H,, M) , can be used to attack it. By carrying out brute-force target attack on it, 'hitting a target' requires about 22m computations of hash values. (5) (ii) Collision attack and semi-free-start collision attack: Although slightly different from the target attack, we can still obtain A4'+, = Mi-l from eqn. 5 when performing a collision attack and semi-freestart collision attack on the new hash round function. It implies that the hash round function can completely resist a collision attack and a semi-free-start collision attack. At least two rounds of these attacks on the new hash function need to be carried out successively. For more than the two rounds of our proposal, the dependent relations of hash outputs to hash inputs are too complex to provide any help to these attacks on it.
(iii) Free-start target attack and free-start collision attack: The hash round function in our proposal consists of two subfunctions, which are illustrated in Fig. 2 .
From Fig. 2 , we find that the first subfunction is the same as in the DM-scheme. In addition, we can prove that the second subfunction is equivalent (in the sense of security) to that of the DMscheme. Thus, a free-start-target attack and free-start collision attack on the hash round function implies that we must attack two DM-schemes simultaneously. The DM-scheme with MD-strengthening is generally considered to be secure in the sense that, if the block cipher has no known weakness, then no attack better than a bruteforce attack is known. If a free-start target attack and free-start collision attack on one subfunction provides no help in attacking the other subfunction, we can expect that the attacks on the new hash round function will have complexity equal to the product of the complexities of the attacks on the two subfunctions.
On the basis of proposition 2 in [4] , the new hash function has roughly the same computational security against free-start target attack and free-start collision attack as its hash round function if the underlying block cipher has no known weakness.
Conclusion:
A new 2m-bit iterated hash function, which is based on an m-bit block cipher with 2m-bit key, has been proposed. When the underlying block cipher is assumed to have no weakness, the new hash funclion can be expected to have ideal computational security against the five attacks (see Table 1 for a summary). Introduction: A broadcasting cryptosystem is used to achieve secure communications over an insecure channel so that only the specified subset of users can obtain the message in one single broadcasting transaction. In 1991, Chang and Wu [I] proposed a broadcasting cryptosystem using interpolating polynomials and geometric properties of circles. Recently, Hwang et al. [2] and Lin and Chen [3] separately demonstrated a successful attack on the Chang-Wu scheme, and showed that in the Chang-Wu scheme, any malicious user who is a legal receiver of a broadcasting transaction can derive the originator's and all other legal receivers' secrets by plotting another legal broadcasting transaction to these users. In fact, the original Chang-Wu scheme can be further enforced by using a time-variant parameter and a one-way function to protect legal receivers' secrets from being disclosed. In this Letter, we shall present an improvement of the Chang-Wu scheme using geometric properties of lines. Our improvement repairs the security flaws inherent in the original Chang-Wu scheme, while requiring fewer public parameters and less computing time as compared to the enforced Chang-Wu scheme. from H(x), which are also distinct from Po, P,, ..., P,.
(iv) Generate (m+l) circles C, (for i = 0, I, ..., m), where each C, has Pi as the centre and d (P,, S,) as the radius. (v) Randomly choose two distinct points w,, and wZ2 from C, (for i
